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INSURANCE POLICIES-IMPLIED WAIVER OF CONDITIONS.
Vance in his work on Insurance, p. 346, says that, "probably
no branch of the law presents more hopeless conflict and confu-
sion among the cases that is to be found among those involving
questions of waiver and estoppel in insurance law. The objection
to allowing the insured to prove by parol that the insurer has
waived by a prior oral agreement some material provision of the
subsequently issued policy arises, of course out of the fact that it
apparently violates the familiar rule that parol contemporaneous
evidence is inadmissible to vary or contradict the terms of a writ-
ten instrument. i Green?. Ev. (z6th Ed.) Sec. 275. That all prior
parol agreements are merged in a subsequent written contract
embodying the same subject matter is a rule that is probably uni-
versally accepted. Therefore as a consequence of this rule it
follows necessarily that any agreement which may have been made
between the insured and the insurer prior to the issue of the pol-
icy can have no effect upon the rights of the parties unless evi-
denced by a written instrument. Wells v. Ins. Co., 28 Ind. App.
620. It is equally impossible where this rule is in force to show
by parol any facts which would, if they could be shown, estop the
insurer from taking advantage of some particular clause in his
policy.
In England the cases are clearly opposed to a parol waiver of
any of the terms of an insurance policy. Beggar v. Assurance Co.,
(1902) 71 K. B. 79. In this country there is a conflict of authority
although the majority of the State courts undoubtedly favor the
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doctrine allowing parol proof of facts contemporaneous with the
delivery of the policy constituting an estoppel, whereby the in-
surer is prevented from obtaining the benefit from a term of his
written contract provided that term invalidates the policy in its
inception. Born v. ins. Co., 120 Iowa 299; Home Ins. Co. v. Men-
denhall, 164 Ill. 458; fenk v. Ins. Co., 76 Cal. 5x. Prior to the
Northern Assurance Co. Case decided in January, 1902, the
United States Supreme Court was also regarded as irrevocably
committed to the doctrine enunciated in the case of the Union
Afut. Life Ins. Co. v. Wilkinson, 13 Wall. 222. In that case the
court had held that to permit parol testimony to show that the
agent of the company of his own initiative had inserted a false re-
presentation in an insurance policy even though the insured had
afterward signed the policy, did not contradict the written con-
tract but simply estopped the insurance company from
asserting that it was the misrepresentation of the in-
sured. Great was the surprise therefore, when in a decision
characterized by obscure reasoning and supported by unsatisfac-
tory authorities the Supreme Court, by a bare majority, complete-.
ly reversed itself and held that the knowledge of the agent at the
time he insured the property that it was also covered by insurance
in a second company did not operate as a waiver of a condition in
the policy stipulating that the existence of concurrent in.surance
should avoid the policy unless such waiver should be indorsed on
the policy. 183 U. S. 308. Apparently the decision was based on
the theory that since the policy provided for a means whereby
the terms of the policy could be waived, therefore the agent
could not estop the company from setting up the provisions by
any parol agreement which he might make. To state that the
decision did not meet with approval is almost superfluous. The
New York Law Journal characterized it as narrow in spirit and
unjust in result. Likewise in the case of Virginia Fire Ins. Co. v.
Mica Co., (Va.) 46 S. E. 463, the court said that "while the pro-
nouncements of this great cou-t must always command the high-
est respect, its judgment in this particular case is deprived of
such of its value as a precedent by the circumstances that it is not
in harmony with many of its former decisions and that three
judges dissented."
Viewing the situation in this light, it should be a source of
considerable satisfaction, therefore, that in a recent controversy
over the same policy and between the same parties the Supreme
Court has in a unanimous opinion clearly obviated the effect of
the former ruling and by a more circuitous route practically ef-
fectuated the doctrine laid down in the Wilkinson Case. Northern
Assurance Co. v. Grand View Bldg. Ass'n., 27 Sup. Ct. 27, Nov.
19o6. In this case the court held, affirming a decision of the
Supreme Court of Nebraska, that a suit in equity to reform a
policy of fire insurance so that it will express consent to concur-
rent insurance to recover on the instrument as so reformed, may
be maintained after the termination of an unsuccessful action at
law to recover on the unreformed contract. Thus although the
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court does not admit the doctrine of parol waiver it nevertheless
does oviate the harshness of its former ruling by making it pos-
sible to the desired end by a suit in equity to reform the policy in
accordance with the parol agreement.
In an article in the Harvard Law Review for March, z9o2,
criticising the doctrine laid down in the first decision of the Su-
preme Court in this case, an attempt was made to justify the
doctrine of a parol waiver and to show that it did not violate the
parol evidence rule so flagrantly as was supposed. The author
argued that a binding contract of insurance is commonly made
before the policy is issued; that the policy is merely the reduction
of such contract to writing; and that as the limitations ipon the
agents powers contained in the policy could not affect the contract
as previously made it was !trained and inequitable to apply the
parol evidence rule. The writer seems to have forgotten, how-
ever, that the policy must be taken as expressing the final under-
standing of the parties. Union Mfut. Life Ins. Co. v. Afowry, 96 U.
S. 544. It seems to us to be more logical to follow the tendency
of the courts and to frankly admit that in recognizing the parol
waiver theory the parol evidence rule is clearly violated and to
establish an exception in the case of insurance policies Welch v.
Association, (Wis.) 98 N. W. 227; Spalding v. Ins. Co., 7r N. H. 441.
Such an exception seems to be founded on reason and justice
and should meet with our approval. It is hard to find any sub-
stantial reason why the knowledge by an authorized agent of the
company of facts affecting the validity of a policy at its inception
should not be considered as the knowledge of the company
and the company be estopped to set up such facts
to defeat a recovery on the policy. Robbins v. Springfield
Fire Ins. Co., 149 N. Y. 484; Forward v. Continental Fire
Ins. Co., 142 N. Y. 382. A rule of evidence adopted by
the courts as a protection against fraud and false swearing
would, as was said in regard to the analogous rule known as the
"Statute of Frauds," become the instrument of the very fraud it
was intended to prevent, if there did not exist some authority
to correct the universality of its application. Vance on Insurance,
P. 358.
EJECTMENT-REMOVAL OF TELEPHONE WIRES.
Ejectment is a form of action by which possessory titles to
corporeal hereditaments may be tried and possession obtained.
The action lies for the recovery of corporeal hereditainents only
and cannot be maintained where the subject matter of the action
is incorporeal or intangible; for the latter cannot be delivered in
execution by a sheriff and are not subject to entry. These pro-
positions are fundamental. Sedgwick & Wait, Titles to Land, Chap.
IV. It is also elementry, that in its legal signification land has
an indefinite extent upwards as well as downwards, the term in-
cluding not only the face of the earth, but everything under it or
over it as expressed by the maxim cujus est solum, ejus est usque
ad caelur, 2 Blackstone's Cox., .z8.
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In Butler v. Frontier Telephone Co., 36 N. Y. Law Jour. 1139,
the defendant had wrongfully stretched telephone wires across
the land of the plaintiff without in any way physically touching
the soil. The question presented was whether an action of eject-
ment would lie. The statutary action of that name in New York
where the question arose being practically the same as ejectment
at common law. The practical importance of the question being in
the fact that there are certain advantages to the plaintiff peculiar
to ejectment not to be had in other actions. By the application
of the principle cujus est solum it was held that ejectment would lie
on the ground that there had been an ouster from part of the land.
"According to fundamental principles and within the limitation
mentioned, space above land is real estate the same as the land
itself. The law regards the empty space as if it were a solid, in-
separable from the soil, and protects it from hostile occupation
accordingly."
The precise question here presented does not seem to have been
before decided except as this case was presented to the lower
courts. iog App. Div. 217, Yale Law Journal, Vol. XV, p. 246.
A similar question involving the same principle however has fre-
quently arisen where ejectment has been brought because of over-
hanging eaves or cornices. Under such circumstances it has been
held that the action might be maintained. Murphy v. Bolger, 6o
Vt. 723; McCourt v Eckstein, 22 Wis. 153. This was denied how-
ever in Aiken v. Benedict, 39 Barb. 400, upon the ground that the
defendant had taken possession of nothing of which the sheriff
could put the plaintiff in possession. The question was not dis-
cussed at length in any of these cases.
The doctrine upon which the decision in the present case is
based namely, that land embraces the space above and the soil
beneath the surface of the ground, is undisputable. But has not
the court in the present instance unwarrantably extended this
doctrine when it says that the law regards the empty space as a
solid inseparable from the soil ? Is it not more in accord with
reason and common sense that the principle usque ad cadum means
that the owner of land has a right in the nature of an incorporeal
hereditament? Corporeal property signifies property in posses-
sion. By possession is meant physical dealing; consequently there
can be no actual possession of anything which is intangible. An
owner of land cannot physically possess the space above it
any more than he can physically possess an easement or a ser-
vitude. If then, as clearly seems to be the case, the incidental
right to the space above one's lands is an incorporeal heredita-
ment, it is difficult to see how an action of ejectment may be
maintained when another appropriates this space to his own use.
The proper redress could be had by an action on the case or by a
proceeding to abate a nuisance.
It has been repeatedly laid down that ejectment will not lie
for anything of which a sheriff cannot deliver possession, the sub-
ject matter must be something tangible, something which can
be delivered. Childv. Chappell, 9 N. Y. 246. In Jackson v. May, T6
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Johns. 184, it was said that ejectment would only lie for some-
thing attached to the soil. In an early case it was held that such
an action would not lie for a water course or rivulet though its
name be mentioned, because it would be impossible to give ex-
ecution of a thing which is transient and always running. Adams
on Ejectment, z8. Such possession as is required can be given of
mines, quarries and upper rooms in a house, because in each of
these cases there is something which may be physically possessed.
But a sheriff can no more deliver such possession of obstructed
space by removing the obstructions as suggested by the present
decision, than he can give physical possession of an easement by
removing a nuisance which interferes with its enjoyment.
POLICE POWER-CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-REGULATION OF EXPRESS
COMPANIES.
In view of the many important enactments, state and Federal,
of late years, prohibiting discriminations in rates and service by
public service corporations, and which have been upheld by the
courts, the recent holding of the Supreme Court of Indiana in the
case of American Express Co. v. Southern Indiana Express Co. (78
N. E. Rep. 1021), is perhaps in line with the weight of authority
on this point.
The statute of Indiana (Acts 1901, p. 149), provides that
express companies shall grant to all consignors, including other
responsible express companies as consignors, equal terms and
accommodations in the carriage and continuance of carriage of
goods and prohibits them fr.m granting to any one carrier any
privileges or accommodations not granted to all others.
The case under discussion arose on a statutory remedy of
injunction sought by the appellee for a violation of the above stat-
ute, and upon the hearing the act was declared a valid exercise of
the police power and not violative of the fourteenth amendment
of the Federal Constitution on the ground that it is an attempt to
deprive an express company of its rights and to take its property
without due process of law; and further, that it attempts to take
from an express company the common law right to contract.
Although the court does not enter into a discussion of the
police power of the state, its decision is fully sustained by the
decisions of the same and other courts.
"Great interests which have grown up and which closely and
seriously affect the commercial convenience and prosperity of all
the people of the state.-interests which, in their present form
and dimensions, were unknown to the common law-are both
proper and necessary subjects of police protection, regulation and
control. 'It cannot be safely admitted that these vast and power-
ful agencies, by and through which a large part of the carrying
trade of the people of the state is conducted, are beyond the con-
trol of the legislature. The well-being of the people demands
that they shall at all times be subject to the rein and curb of the
law, and that their methods of conducting their business must
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conform to those principles of fairness and justice with which the
interests of the public are inseparably bound up. The relations
of such agencies to the public and to each other, and an authori-
tative declaration and definition of their duties and obligations,
are clearly within the scope of legislative authority wherever
important public interests are involved." (Adams' Exgress Co. v.
State, 161 Ind. 328.)
The act under examination belongs to that class of legislation
which has been found necessary to prevent the destruction of
competition, and exclusive possession by the few of the great
fields of industry and enterprise. It has never been denied that
in the exercise of the police power, property rights may be sacri-
ficed, natural privileges curtailed, and liberty restricted or taken
away. However, as the public peace, safety and well-being are
the very end and object of free government, legislation which is
necessary for the protection and furtherance of this object cannot
be defeated on the ground that it interferes with the common law
rights of some of the citzens, or even deprives them of such
rights. (Railroad v. Jackson, 179 U. S. 287.)
While the tendencies of these decisions, carried to extreme.
limits, would seem to subject the public to any and all sorts of
legislation enacted under the guise of an exercise of the police
power, yet this danger is not apparent when it is considered that
review may be had by the courts of all such legislation where
constitutional rights and guaranties are involved, thus limiting,
in such cases, the otherwise sole and absolute legislative discre-
tion in matters involving the public welfare.
MORTGAGES-INJUNCTION TO RESTRAIN FORECLOSURE UNDER POWER
OF SALE--LIMITATIONS.
House v. Carr, 78 N.E. 176, decided by the Court of Appeals of
New York, presents an unusual as well as difficult question of
equity. The suit was brought by the successors of the mortgagor
to restrain by injunction the foreclosure of a mortgage barred by
the statute of limitations. For twenty years the original mort-
gagee made no effort to enforce his right against the mortgagor
and for over seven years after the statute of limitations had run
he made no demand upon the successors of the mortgagor in
possession of the land. Satisfaction of the mortgage was not
claimed in the complaint. The foreclosure was being sought by
the administrator of the mortgagee. This court refused to
restrain the foreclosure reversing the judgment of the Appellate
Division. Vann, Haight and Werner, JJ., dissenting. The
majority opinion delivered by Cullen, C. J., cites Goldfrank v.
Young, 64 Tex. 432 as in point and follows its arguments consid-
erably. In that case a sale under a trust deed was allowed,
although the right of action secured thereby was barred by the
statute of limitations. The creditors had urged their claims and
no great time had elapsed as in this case of House v. Carr. There
the very attitude of the debtor clearly showed a calculating inten-
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tion to avoid payment of the debt which he had no reason to
believe had been abandoned.
The principle that a statute of limitations affects the remedy
but not the merits seems well established in New York. Heribert
v. Clark, 128 N. Y. 295; Campbell v. Holt, "i5 U. S. 62o. Cullen,
C. J., says: "though the statute may have barred one remedy on
the debt, if there be another remedy not affected by the statute,
or one to which a different limitation will apply, a creditor may
enforce his claim through that remedy." Applying that principle
to this case the court held that the limitation did not bar the stat-
utory foreclosure by advertisement, so no relief could be had,
although the debt and mortgage had been barred for over eight
years. This principle thus extended seems to violate that spirit
of equity that frowns on stale claims and that equity will refuse
to enforce a right when one by neglect has not asserted his right
until its assertion would take the defendant by surprise and
involve him in litigation which by acts of parties he was justified
in believing had been abandoned. Helen v. Yerger, 6z Miss. 44.
The fact that this man is entitled to relief by statute and yet is
powerless to set up the defense simply by defendant's choice of
mode of foreclosure seems unjust. The injustice is well argued
by Vann, J., in the dissenting opinion. On examination of the
cases the fault appears to be in the statute and not in the applica-
tion of the law. By a peculiar state of facts the statute of limita-
tions is avoided, its spirit rendered powerless. A statute allows a
sale out of court to have equal presumptive force and effect as
though executed by order of court. To the foreclosure in court
the statute of limitations is a complete defense; to the foreclosure
out of court reaching the same result there is no remedy. Cullen,
C. J., states in the majority opinion that this statute has been
practically the same for a century. The common law presump-
tion of payment, after twenty years, the statutes of limitation,
equity's attitude toward laches and equity's recognition of the
statutes of limitation by analogy are all based upon the apprecia-
tion that great hardship is done in enforcing old claims and that
the ends of justice require the encouragement of the diligent.
The plaintiffs in this case are in a defensive position. Vann, J.,
in the dissenting opinion argues that equity should look to the
substance and not the form and thus grant the relief sought. In
Butler v. Johnson, iii N. Y. 204, quoted by Vann, J., an injunc-
tion was allowed as in substance a defense, but there the result
attained was the same as that to which the plaintiff would have
been entitled if the executrix had been allowed to continue her
purpose.
In the present case the defensive position of the plaintiffs is
easily conceded, but the relief sought, by injunction, is primarily
an affirmative relief. In the plaintiff's behalf equity could not
relieve from the cloud of title, so here equity will not grant relief
from the foreclosure by a defense, the instrument of which is
affirmative action and which in effect would clear the cloud from
the title. r Pomeroy's EquiY, 42 1. Mr. Justice Miller says that
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the defense of lapse of time to an obligation to pay money is no
natural right. "It is the creation of conventional law." Camp-
bellv. folt, ii 5 U. S. 620. Aside from the theory of the right of
a defense given to a party in a given instance it seems unjust that
circumstances should be allowed to prevent his taking advantage
of the defense. Strict following of technical principles, however,
seems to warrant this decision under consideration. The remedy
for the apparent injustice seems to depend on legislative action.
But in this day of complicated difficulties in obtaining needed
legislation it affords a good subject for serious consideration
whether it would not be more practicable for equity to take the
broad liberal attitude to promote justice, the spirit of which is
expressed in the able arguments of Vann, J., in the dissenting
opinion.
RE-DELIVERY OF DEEDS-CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS.
An abstract principle of law may be well recognized, yet in
the application of it to concrete facts as they may arise in new
and varying forms, there is often a source of considerable difficulty.
And it is in this correlating of old principles and new facts that
our interest is largely centered.
A decision handed down October 23, 19o6, by. the Supreme
Court of Illinois in the case of Crossman v. Keister, 79 N. E. 58, is
well illustrative of the foregging. Two important questions are
there discussed, one being as to the legal effect of a re. delivery of
a deed by the grantee therein to the grantor with the intention of
re-vesting title in the latter; the other relative to the creation of
a constructive trust.
In regard to the first proposition, the Court holds that such re-
delivery cannot operate to pass the legal title. 5 Ill. 452; 70 Ill.
App. 185. This seems to be the rule except in three New Eng-
land jurisdictions, where by invoking the aid of the estppel inpais
doctrine the purpose of the parties is effectuated. 24 Me. 3xi; 9
Pick. xo5; 33 N. H. 487; Washburn on Real Property (VI Ed.)
Sec. 1907. The Court proceeds to state, however, that such an
act under certain circumstances will suffice to pass an equitable
title to the property. This doctrine if carried out to its logical
results would seem to be as effectual in precluding the rights of
the grantee in the deed as the doctrine just previously noted. 112
Ill. 146; 159 Ill. 84; 42 N. E. 305; z56 Ill. 183; 41 N. E. 39.
Relative to the second proposition: the testator gave orders
that a deed from his daughter to himself should be returned to her
after his death, being induced thereby by the daughter's promise
to convey to a third party (appellee). The proof adduced at the
trial showed that the daughter at the time of making the promise
had no intention of fulfilling it. The re-delivery of the deed in
this case, not passing the title to her, the land descended was ad-
ministered upon, and the daughter received a fifth part thereof as
her share, for a conveyance of which this bill was brought by
appellee. The Court, after a careful review of the authorities,
holds that the daughter by her acts was constituted a constructive
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trustee, and, as such, must convey the land which she had re-
ceived to appellee.
The rule has been repeatedly laid down that where a party
procures a devise of land upon a fraudulent promise to convey to
aaother, equity, acting in the exercise of its almost plenary juris-
diction in cases of fraud, will decree such party a trustee. Pome-
roy Eqg. fur. Sec. 1o54; Browne on Frauds, Sec. 94. And it is not
incumbent that the promise shall be in writing, it being a trust
in invitum and I aliing specifically within the exceptions enumera-
ted in the Statute of Frauds. It arises by implication or opera-
tion of law, being based on the ground of fraud. Under this head,
the rules of equity are extremely flexible so as to meet and rectify
any new form of imposition that may arise. Here no devise was
procurcd by fraud, but by fraud the testator was procured to allow
the land to descend instead of devising or deeding it. If it had
not been for the fraudulent pi omise he would undoubtedly have
had time to and would have disposed of it before his death in
accordance with his wishes.
By parity of reasoning, the same rule applies as in the former
cases. The reason for it is augmented by the fact that the parties
stood in a confidential relation, the daughter having the ascend-
ency over her father. To show the solicitude manifested by
cou-ts of equityiu such cases, Lord Chelmsford says in his opinion
in Tate v. Williamson, L. R. 2 Chan Ap. Cas. ;5, "The jurisdic-
tion exercised by courts of equity over the dealings of persons
standing in fiduciary relations has always been regarded as one of
a must salutary description The principles applicable to the
more familiar relations of this chai acter have been long settled by
many'wel known decisions, but the courts have always been
careful not to fetter this useful jurisdiction by defining the exact
limits of its exercise. Whenever two persons stand in such a
relation that confidence is necessarily reposed by one, and the in-
fluence that naturally grows out of that confidence is abused, or
the influence exerted to obtain an advantage at the expense of the
confiding party, the party availing himself of his position will not
be permitted to retain the advantage, although the transaction
could not have been impeached if no confidential relation bad
existed."
Fraud is much more easily inferred where the parties stand in
a fiduciary relation. The rule is generally recognized that where
one party, standing in such relation, obtains or procures property
from the other upon a parol promise to dispose of it to someone
else or to hold it in trust for designated purposes, and has at the
time no intention of doing so, the law will raise a constructive
trust. 176 Ill. 478; 52 N. E. 58. Cases collected in Brison v.
Brison, (Cal.), il Pac. 689. "Where a person by means of his
promises, or otherwise by his general conduct, prevents the exe-
cution of a deed or will in favor nf a third party with a view to
his own benefit, that is clearly within the first head of frauds as
distinguished by Lord Hardwicke, viz : that arising from facts
and circumstances of imposition; and the person so acting will be
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decreed to be a trustee for the injured party, to the extent of the
interest of which he has been thus defrauded." Hill on Trustees.
In this case the property was not obtained in the way anticipated.
Nevertheless it was obtained, which would not have been the case
had it not been for the fraudulent promise, and it is inequitable
that the party should retain the fruits of her wrongs as an advan-
tage of it.
IS A PERSON PROCURING A TICKET BY FRAUD 
A PASSENGER?
In the case of Fitzmaurice v. N. Y., N. B. and H. R. R. Co.,
decided by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts and reported in
78 N. E. 418, it was decided that a person, who 
by fraud, pro-
cured a ticket at a reduced rate, was not a passenger. So to re-
cover for an injury while on the train of the defendant company,
nothing short of a wilful injury could be proved to support the
plaintiff's action.
It is a well recognized principle of law that a trespasser on
railroad property is protected only from wilful wrong on the part
of the railroad. Condran v. Chicago, Minn. &- St. Paul Railway
Company, 67 Fed., 522. Another principle, supported by a great
weight of authority, sustains the proposition that the duties 
of a
railroad company to a person as a passenger only attach when
that person has been accepted as a passenger. Such a relation can
only be entered into by means of a contract between the railroad
company and some person. This contract may be expressed 
or
implied Hale, Bailments and Carriers, p. 493
It is also maintained by many authorities that this relation
must have been entered into fairly, and fraud on the part of the
passenger in evading fare avoids the contract 'o carry as a
passenger and makes the latter a trespasser. Toledo, Wabash
and Western Railway Co. v. Beggs, 28 Am. St. Rep., 613.
There appears to be nothing illogical in this doctrine and no
stricter than is necessary to protect the railroad. But for a decis-
ion by the Uaited States Circuit Court for New York reported 
in
the case of Robostolli v. N. Y., N. H. and H. R. R. Co., 33 Fed.
796, the decisions would appear to be almost unanimous 
in their
general trend, holding that a person cannot become 
a passenger
by practising a fraud on the railroad. That was a case where a
person presented for passage on a train of the defendant company,
a non-transferable commutation ticket issued to another. The
trial judge instructed the jury that if he presented in good faith
the ticket, and he was carried as a passenger upon it, he was then
entitled to the protection afforded other passengers. This in-
struction was upheld on the ground that he did not represent
himself to be Roehrs. the person to whom the ticket was
originally issued. The Court said, "But here the intestate was
in a passenger car, on a passenger train, claiming to be 
a
passenger on the commutation ticket, and his claim was recog-
nized." It is difficult to imagine how anybody could present a non-
transferable ticket, issued to someone else, in good faith. Why
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the mere presentation of the ticket issued to someone else was
not an attempt to represent himself as Roehrs, does not seem
clear.
There might seem to be some hardship in the case of a person
who had paid all but a few cents of the price of his ticket, with
knowledge of the fact, being precluded from an action for a broken
leg, but the law applied logically would undoubtedly deny the
holder of the ticket any remedy. In the principal case, the fact
that the conductor had accepted the coupons in payment of the
fare of the plaintiff could make no difference in the final result,
as such only shows what a skilful unprincipled person can do.
Surely no estoppel could be invoked where one's rights are not
known. Or had the conductor accepted the coupons with knowl-
edge of the facts, the company's liabilities and duties would not
thereby be increased, as he would exceed both his actual and
apparent authority; he could not waive the defendant's rights.
It is the fraud, in whatsoever form it may appear, that changes
the apparent status of passenger to that of trespasser. This view
maintained by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts certainly
seems to be supported by logic and authority.
